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Abstract 
This paper attempts to briefly sketch the discursive 
development of critique in critical theories from 
modernity (Kant and Marx) to postmodernity (Foucault 
and Butler). Critique has evolved from negative criticism 
of the product or output of discourse to the production of 
or the possibility of discourse. Moreover, there has been a 
movement from a framework of critique to the critique of 
alterity (Levinas). The paper demonstrates that this 
Levinasian critique has shifted from the auto-critique 
(focus on the self) to alter-critique (focus on the other). 
The other not just returns the gaze of the self but also 
contests that gaze in the name of justice.   
Keywords: Critical Theory, Enlightenment and Modernity 
1. Introduction 
Critique is a modern construction of the enlightenment.i During the 
Enlightenment, philosophers relied on the faculty of reason as the 
primary source of authority and legitimacy. Enlightenment enabled 
people to use their reason in the pursuit of knowledge, direct their 
action in the public sphere and achieve their goal towards 
emancipation and autonomy. As a precondition, it was argued that 
reason should be unfettered from the clutches of tradition and 
authority. In that way, it can freely exercise its faculty in advancing 
individual liberty and religious tolerance.  The government and the 
church were the main targets of the critique of enlightenment as it 
was argued that the former stifled and retarded maturity or 
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advancement of reason and defended tradition and authority. By 
insulating themselves from critique, the government and church 
effectively delegitimised themselves from the public. To have 
legitimacy, the government and church must have passed the test 
of critique. Enlightenment negated the despotism of the absolute 
monarchy of the government and rigid dogma of the ecclesiastical 
authority of the church. In particular, the institutional church was 
being criticised because of its defence of hierarchy and dogma. The 
hierarchy guarded the dogma against any contagion and sacrilege. 
Enlightenment in a way was a critique of medieval philosophy that 
put more focus on tradition and authority.ii The light of reason in 
the enlightenment was contrasted with the dark ages of 
medievalism. Reason, they argued, can cast out the prevailing 
darkness and reveal the illuminated reality. To be enlightened, 
people must use their reason and emancipate themselves from 
ignorance.  
2. Critique of Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx 
In the period of modernity, the argument from critique was 
associated with Immanuel Kant who focussed on the 
understanding of critique in his philosophical reflections. In fact, 
Kant formulated the dictum that ―everything must submit to 
critique, even reason itself‖ (Ground, 2012, p. 7; Raffnsøe, 2015, p. 
1). In this sense, nothing was spared from the omnipotence of 
critique.iii Both the outside world of things and the internal world 
of knowledge were subject to critique (Kant, 1996; Foucault, 1984, 
pp. 32-50). For Kant, the mind possessed structures that filtered the 
chaos in the world and made sense of that world. The 
transcendental ego or self synthesised the world by positing a 
priori categories which constituted human consciousness and 
organised human perceptions (Olsses, 2003, p. 81). Reason gave 
unity and order to cognitions and experiences (McQuillan, 2012, p. 
75). Kant overturned metaphysics by proclaiming the death of 
metaphysics and installed epistemology by elevating the place of 
reason.iv The onto-theology of God was replaced by the 
epistemology of man that questioned tradition and authority and 
aimed for liberty and autonomy. It was no longer the omniscience 
of God, but the rationality of man that occupied the centre stage. 
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Moreover, Kant split the disciplinary domains of politics and 
philosophy. Politics referred to the domain of the state that 
sanctioned governmental actions and protected the common goods. 
Philosophy was the domain of reason that arbitrated governmental 
actions and public goods. Philosophy could only exercise its 
function if reason remained unconstrained from government 
intervention and repression. Rationality, unfettered from tradition 
and authority, defined the essential nature of man and reason 
became the court that arbitrated contestations. In Kant, critique 
operated not only in philosophy but also questioned the legitimate 
grounds of various public and governmental agencies. 
Aside from Kant, Karl Marx was another heir of the enlightenment. 
Marx employed the immanent critique by scrutinising the internal 
contradictions in society (Marx & Engels, 1978, pp. 331-362). In this 
sense, the critique was analytical as it clarified the reality of human 
nature and practical as it pursued the struggle of the workers. 
(Calikates, 2012, pp. 101-102). Capitalism split society into two 
classes—the bourgeois class and the proletariat class. The private 
property of the bourgeoisie enslaved the proletarians in this class 
division because they were tied up at the mercy of the capitalists. 
The capitalists monopolised the profit and the workers received the 
less than minimum wages because the bourgeois class who owned 
the capital exploited and oppressed the proletariat from their 
labour. Marx criticised bourgeois society because it fostered 
dependency analogous to a master and slave relationship. For 
Marx, the bourgeois class employed ideology to advance its self-
serving interests and at the expense of the proletariat class. 
Ideology was a false consciousness that obscured reality and 
masked misery. The ruling class controlled the reigning ideas. They 
did not only control material wealth but also intellectual ideas. This 
society maintained the power of the capitalists that exploited and 
oppressed labour. In effect, labour was alienated from its nature 
because its creative power was taken away from it and snatched by 
the capitalists. Both capitalism and religion were instruments of the 
bourgeois against the toiling labour. Capitalism and religion 
alienated people from their natural capacity. Human nature was a 
self-creation through its labour and production. Moreover, religion 
was likened to the opium of the people that only hid or 
romanticised sufferings. The workers suffered from exploitation 
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and oppression by the capitalists who extracted surplus value from 
labour. Religion provided relief and consolation from that 
desolation and affliction. Thus, religion was ―a symptom of real 
social and political conflicts rather than a mere delusion or error‖ 
(Calikates, 2012, p. 110). Instead of liberating them from this 
slavery, religion taught them to be patient and optimistic to the 
afterlife (Marx, 1978, p. 15). Both capitalism and religion needed to 
be subjected to a defetishising critique (Calikates, 2012, p. 105). This 
critique aimed at freeing the consciousness of the workers and 
empowering them to engage in a collective struggle and freedom. 
This dependency and slavery would only end once capitalism and 
religion were eliminated from society. 
The heritage of Kantian idealism and Marxist materialism has 
influenced the formation of critical theory. Critical theory is based 
on the reflexive turn in philosophy which ―offers a distinctive 
answer to the problem of rationality […] and inquiry into the 
nature and scope of human knowledge. [..]‖ (Peters, Olssen & 
Lankshear, 2003, p. 17). Critique is basically applied to knowledge 
and the activities promoted, created and validated by and in the 
society. Knowledge is a cognitive construction by the 
transcendental ego or the ruling class.  The transcendental self 
synthesises the data from the world and categorises them into 
intelligible scheme. It can oversee the competing claims and judge 
convincing claims. The ruling class produces the ideas and controls 
the mentality of the workers. It propagates an ideology that 
deceives the workers and perpetuates their alienation from their 
nature. However, this knowledge can be questioned and undone 
by the tribunal of reason and struggle for emancipation. This 
ideological claim can be unmasked through critique and the 
alienation can be undone. Enlightenment can emancipate the 
people from ignorance and from manipulation. Thus, critical theory 
influenced by Kant and Marx can emancipate or liberate both 
knowledge and society from remaining immature and oppressed 
by the power-that-be that distorts the worldview and that alienates 
people from their nature. Since it is constructed by the human mind 
and the ruling class, knowledge can be freed from immaturity and 
manipulation. When people recognise the construction and 
manipulation of knowledge, they can emancipate themselves from 
ignorance and alienation.  
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3. Critique of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler 
Michel Foucault takes the clue from the enlightenment and 
Kantianism in his brand of critique.v For Foucault, critique is not 
just a matter of fault-finding or nay-saying by showing the errors 
and fallacies of reason (Foucault, 1997). Critique should go deeper 
into structures of reason or knowledge. Foucault questions the 
assumptions or presuppositions that frame the mind. Thus, the 
Kantian transcendental ego or self is interrogated from its mental 
categories that construct its knowledge. The framework authorises 
the deployment of those discourses or theories. Foucault asks a set 
of questions like ―in what way and by what right‖ that enable the 
deployment of such discourses and theories (Butler, 2009, p. 778). 
Thus, the critique goes to the core of the matter, that is, the 
framework of mind or mindset of thought that permits or prohibits 
the deployment of such discourses or practices. When reason 
exposes that self-legitimation, it inevitably enters into a question of 
power. Foucault argued that knowledge and power are inseparably 
linked. The self is subjected and subjectivated by this matrix of 
power and knowledge (Foucault, 1982; Foucault, 1980).  Foucault 
asks the question: ―What is the relation of knowledge to power 
such that our epistemological certainties turn out to support a way 
of structuring the world that forecloses alternative possibilities of 
ordering?‖ (Butler, 2001). 
However, Foucault departs from Kant‘s splitting of politics as a 
domain of the state or government and philosophy as the domain 
of unrestrained reason. When Kant made this separation, he 
subjected or subsumed politics to philosophy. Philosophy is 
instituted as unconstrained or unrestrained by any intervention or 
subordination so that it can freely exercise its power. Philosophy is 
installed as an extraordinary arbiter of the discipline of politics. 
This freedom defines the task of philosophy. Freedom is a 
precondition for its critical function in politics. The withdrawal of 
state intervention provides philosophy with a privilege and 
leverage in the exercise of reason in critique (Butler, 2009, p. 779). 
However, in the production of knowledge, politics and philosophy 
are implicated or intertwined in its exercise or practice. Thus, the 
questions of ―in what way‖ and ―by what right?‖ expose the 
legitimating ground of justification of reason and the legitimating 
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power of the self in discourse (Butler, 2009, p. 778). The splitting of 
politics and philosophy advantages philosophy and subjects 
politics into its arbitration. In this split, philosophy seems to be 
insulated from politics and such insulation places philosophy to a 
privilege status as the arbiter or court of uncontaminated truth. In 
Foucault, this disciplinary division between politics and 
philosophyshould be transgressed and negotiated.  
In Foucault‘s view, critique functions in two different domains. 
First, critique begins with the regime of rationality in questioning 
the demand for absolute obedience and second, critique inquires on 
the governmental obligation imposed on subjects to a rational and 
reﬂective evaluation (Butler, 2009, pp. 787-788). Thus, Foucault 
proposes an attitude of critique which he identifies as an ethos, that 
is, as a way of acting or behaving in the transformation of the self. 
One should not subordinate himself or herself to the regime of 
authority but one must elaborate or produce himself or herself into 
a project of self-invention. The first function is negative because it is 
a refusal to submit oneself to authority, but the second function is 
positive since it elaborates aesthetics of the self. In this sense, the 
refusal is a condition that opens space for this self-creation (Butler, 
2009, p. 787). Butler argued that ―this capacity to form reasons will 
be importantly linked to the self-transformative relation […]. To be 
critical of an authority that poses as absolute requires a critical 
practice that has self-transformation at its core‖ (Butler, 2001).  
Following Foucault, Judith Butler proffers her version of critique. 
However, her critique is elevated into a meta-critique since it is on 
the level of a critique of critique. She explains that this critique of 
critique is an elaboration and interrogation that ―call into question 
the implicit and uncritical preconditions of its operation‖ (Butler, 
2009, p. 781). If we allow critique to have criteria and agenda as a 
precondition, then it is already a priori, restricted or constrained in 
its exercise because one is forced to enter and accept such 
requirement that allows and prohibits critique. This restriction or 
constraint constitutes a delimiting power in the exercise of critique. 
In that case, ―we need something like a critique of critique to 
understand these other differentiating effects of power and to undo 
their effects‖ (Butler, 2009, p. 783). These effects are manifested in 
the production of knowledge that delimit and determine their 
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possibilities. Thus, ―critique is the operation that seeks to 
understand how delimited conditions form the basis for the 
legitimate use of reason in order to determine what can be known, 
what must be done, and what may be hoped‖ as the aims of 
critique (Butler, 2009, p. 787). Thus, the aim of the critique is to look 
into the effects of power and the delimited conditions of rationality 
that restrains or constrains the free exercise of reason.  
4. Foucault and Emmanuel Levinas 
According to Butler, Foucault provides a critique of the 
subordination of the self to the regime of authority. This critique 
focuses on the ethos of the self as a matter of self-invention or self-
transformation. Butler ignores another critique that Foucault 
broaches in her discussion on the linkage or connection between 
power and knowledge. Foucault mentions the critique of the 
insurrection of subjugated knowledge. He highlights the power 
that includes and excludes, allows and prohibits in the production 
of knowledge in institutions. The reemergence of this knowledge 
can interrogate the established knowledge where criticism can 
perform its task (Olsses, 2003, p. 89). He deals with the politics of 
knowledge as resistance to power. If there is power, there is 
resistance, as he once asserted. The subjugated knowledge is buried 
on the ground and pressed on the margin. They are reduced to 
invisibility or relegated to unknowability. Foucault wanted to 
reclaim subjugated knowledge to counter or interrogate the 
hegemonic knowledge operating in our society. Knowledge comes 
from the subaltern groups that struggle for expression and 
representation. Subjugated knowledge has been undermined and 
discredited in discourses and theories. As such, they must be 
articulated and represented in discourses.  
One can link subjugated knowledge to the Levinasian Other. 
However, we need a caveat that this knowledge is not enclosed or 
finalised but always tentative and provisional so that one does not 
fall into the trap of totalisation or totalitarianism. Totalisation or 
totalitarianism forecloses the possibility of alterity or alteration. It 
relies on its self-sufficiency and self-assurance that it can auto-
correct itself due to its reflexivity or reflectivity. In this sense, 
consciousness originates from the self or ego and develops this 
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consciousness from its own faculty.  In this perspective, knowledge 
is organised and systematic. In a way, this knowledge has been 
sedimented into tradition and therefore it resists alteration or 
transformation. This knowledge is merely reproduced or passed on 
to others who will just mimic or repeat it. If ever it changes, 
knowledge merely accommodates or assimilates alterity; it does not 
respect it. Alterity is merely eaten up or swallowed up within the 
self that expands in the process of absorbing or taking the Other. 
The Other is internalised and digested into the self. In this sense, 
the Other is actually not just marginalised but excluded by the self 
because there is no space left for the Other by the self that totally 
obliterates it.  
Emmanuel Levinas inverts the hierarchy of the self and the other 
and asserts the priority of the other to the self (Moyn, 2005). The 
Other is the one other than me (Egea-Kuehne, 2003, p. 111). 
Historically, the Other has been marginalised and excluded from 
the dominant western discourses or philosophies. Levinas provides 
the space for the Other by inverting the self/other hierarchy and by 
prioritising the Other. The Other critiques the dominant self and 
offers an alternative world. We have to note that we can expand the 
scope of the Other to include the subordinated women, 
discriminated colonies, slaved races, relegated men and 
disadvantaged poor, to name a few. Thus, the Other is no longer 
homogenous but heterogeneous because it can refer to many others 
marginalized or exclude by the dominant self. These Others 
interrupt the self that arrogates the power of ventriloquism and 
totalitarianism.   Levinas asks the questions: ―What does it mean to 
be on the margins of the knowable and the known?‖ and ―How 
does thinking, being, creating and acting as and from the position 
of the Other transform the meaning of the thought and imaginary 
of each?‖ (Drabinsky, 2011, p. xiii).  
As a philosopher of ethics, Levinas develops the philosophy of the 
(face of the) Other. For Levinas, the Other signifies infinity. 
Drabinski asserts that ―the Other exceeds all categories‖ (Drabinski, 
2011, p. 2), that is ―outside language, outside conceptualization, 
outside notion of teleology‖ (Drabinski, 2011, p. xii) that neutralises 
or abrogates difference. Thus, the Other is radical because it is 
immeasurable or incalculable. Drabinski articulates that ―radical 
Delfo C Canceran                                                                  Critiquing Critique 
19 
 
difference signifies a relation of obligation, a sense of responsibility 
that exceeds my grasp and my comprehension yet at the same time 
weighs upon me and makes me the subject I am‖ (Drabinski, 2011, 
p. xii). The self cannot grasp or capture the Other because it eludes 
or escapes any grasp and comprehension. Levinas relies on the 
biblical message of the Other that lays the foundation on his ethics 
of the Other. The I is in a face-to-face encounter with the Other. In 
that encounter, the I encounters directly the face of the Other 
human being and indirectly the transcendental Other - God. Egea-
Kuehne observed that ―in the face-to-face encounter, he/[she] sees, 
beyond all knowledge, an elevation of the ethical order, an indirect 
encounter with a transcendental God, a relation to Infinity‖ (Egea-
Kuehne, 2003, p. 110). Ethics is defined as a relation to the Other. In 
that encounter, the Other appeals to us. We cannot escape it. The 
Other calls us to responsibility and we must heed it with humility. 
Thomas stated that ―responsibility is not simply bad conscience nor 
conscience as the fact that one hears the silent call of being. 
Responsibility is prior to the response given to the call‖ (Thomas, 
2004, p. 132).  
The face is an invitation to justice. It opens up the possibility of 
response, dialogue or exchanges out of which reason and 
knowledge are produced (Thomas, 2004, p. 106). Thomas notes, 
―Levinas insists that the face to face relation is the ethos of reason 
itself. It does not found reason but opens reason to critique and 
renewal‖ (Thomas, 2004, p. 108). The Other awakens me to the 
question of justice but, at the same time, confronts me with the 
question of responsibility (Thomas, 2004, p. 111), ―in other words, 
justice is conceived of as arising as a response to the suffering of the 
Other‖ (Thomas, 2004, p. 116). Justice is the acknowledgement of 
and respect to the Other (Egea-Kuehne, 2003, p. 115). Levinas is 
concerned with the ethical justice which ―arises out of a singular 
relation to another and does not presuppose a pre-existing 
universal‖ (Thomas, 2004, p. 117). The Other assumes a concrete 
particularity and becomes a model of social relation.vi In this sense, 
―to be in relation to the Other is to […] offer a critique of justice 
conceived in traditional moral or juridical terms‖ (Thomas, 2004, p. 
119). The traditional or juridical justice is measured or calculated in 
terms of the due or right of the Other. In this sense, the Other is no 
longer infinite but finite. The self measures or calculates the due or 
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right given or accorded to the Other. The self occupies the superior 
status in relation to the inferior Other. Moreover, Levinas reverses 
the hierarchy of freedom and justice. For him, justice precedes 
freedom. Thomas further notes, ―For Levinas, the question of 
freedom is concerned solely with securing a place for the same 
(self) – securing the identity of subjectivity within itself and 
affirming a right to be on the grounds of a certain necessity or 
truth. The question of justice for Levinas is not one of how to 
guarantee this right but putting of it into question. The Other calls 
the subject into question, thereby putting the obligation with 
regard to the Other before obligation to oneself‖ (Thomas, 2004, p. 
122). In short, justice is a responsibility to the Other that calls into 
question the freedom and identity of the self. The freedom and 
identity of the self are subordinate to the priority and summon of 
the Other that provides its freedom and identity.  
5. Conclusion 
Critique dominantly remains on the level of fault-finding or nay-
saying that shows the flaws and fallacies of certain philosophers or 
philosophies. Scholars have not transcended that notion perhaps 
because that can easily be detected from their works or 
demonstrated by logic. To show that scholars have transcended 
these philosophers or philosophies, they title their works in a way 
that overcomes these flaws and fallacies using the word ‗beyond‘ 
such as ‗beyond dialectics‘ and ‗beyond being‘. There is a 
presumption that reason is equipped with the capacity to unveil 
error and lack and eventually rectify or fill them. Thus, reason can 
disclose the fault of reason and overcome it. In a way, reason can 
err but it can be corrected by a better reason and thereby correct it 
once it realises that the alternative is more cogent. There is a 
tendency of some scholars to follow the unveiling or discovering of 
mistake or dearth on their arguments and thereby overcoming or 
transcending them. These scholars have criticised these defective or 
erroneous arguments and offered their corrected or expanded 
version. They still work within general logic and discourse of those 
philosophies and philosophers but only surmounted their setback 
or impasse. In this sense, critique does not only offer better but also 
higher alternative explanation or interpretation of the problem.  
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Moreover, the notion of critique is also associated with the inquiry 
that investigates or examines the works or arguments forwarded by 
scholars. Inquiry finds out the answer to a mystery. However, the 
inquiry is limited in its operation because it depends on the 
availability or accessibility of the materials given for examination 
or investigation. In this way, the inquiry is circumscribed or 
bounded by the limits imposed on its operation. Thus, the inquiry 
is not only limited but also enclosed within that particular 
maneuver. Critique goes to a deeper operation because it ―takes 
place through the formulation of a set of questions‖ (Butler, 2009, p. 
776). If inquiry answers a question, critique asks a question. 
Questions are more important than answers in the critique. One has 
to interrogate the limits imposed and the conditions required in the 
operation of reason. These limits and conditions can prohibit that 
function of critique and therefore eventually paralyse it. In order to 
interrogate these limits and conditions, we need to turn ourselves 
not to inward movement of self-reflection or self-critique but to the 
primordial presence or summon of the Other. If we stick to the self 
as self-creation or self-transformation, we may end up with the 
Cartesian solipsism or with Freudian narcissism because it tends to 
be self-referential or self-enclosed. However, if we turn to the Other 
and not to the self, we encounter the Other as a revelation and 
critique of the self. There is the Other calling me and appealing to 
me. I cannot ignore or evade the Other. The critique, therefore, 
shifts from mere aesthetics to ethics. The I is related to the Other, 
not by mere epistemology but by responsibility. This responsibility 
is boundless and limitless because the Other is infinite.  
Critiquing critique relies on what Foucault calls ‗permanent 
critique‘ because one should never be complacent but always be 
wary of the possibility of marginalisation and exclusion of other 
reasons and rationalities. Critique is a constant and restless in 
suspecting closure and opening spaces for alterity.  Critique is 
possible because there is an alternative way of thinking and doing 
otherwise for the sake of the many Others. Discourses and practices 
can be undone because they are not born, but made. Others – the 
subaltern groups – have been marginalised or excluded historically 
and epistemologically in the representation of their knowledge. If 
ever they are represented, the self represents them and, if ever the 
self represents them, it under-represents or misrepresents them. In 
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either case, they are at the mercy of the self. In this way, the self 
remains superior and powerful in representing its Others. We need 
to reverse the hierarchy and demote the self.  Others should be 
given the priority and space in expressing themselves, their 
experiences and their identities. They can return the gaze of the self 
that encloses or limits them and they can confidently represent and 
assert themselves. They should be allowed to express themselves in 
their own voices and words. The self in turn should listen and 
commiserate with the Others. In this way, we democratise the 
space for the advent and alterity of the Others that surprises and 
transforms the self.  The self is then responsible for the Other.  
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i Greek Philosophy has its krisis. For Wendy Ground, ―krisis integrates 
polis rupture, tribunal, knowledge, judgment and repair, at the same 
time that it links subject and object in practice. Krisis refers to a specific 
work of the polis on itself—a practice of sifting, sorting, judging, and 
repairing what has been rent by a citizen violation of polis law or order‖ 
(Ground, 2009, p. 9).  
ii There is an interested debate on the relationship between critique and 
secularism. Critique and secularism arose in the modern period and 
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scholars assume that critique is a secular rationality (Asad, Brown,Butler 
and Mahmood, 2009).   
iii According to Foucault, Kant founded two critical traditions in 
philosophy. First, he founded that critical tradition that asks the 
question: Under what conditions that true knowledge is possible? 
Second, he founded that critical tradition that asks the question: ―What 
is the contemporary field of possible experience?‖ (Olssen, 2003, p. 74). 
iv McQuillan is more careful in the full death of metaphysics in Kant by 
distinguishing the special metaphysics and general metaphysics. For 
McQuillan, ―Kant excludes empirical considerations and the traditional 
concerns of metaphysica specialis from [general] metaphysics precisely 
because he is committed to the view that metaphysics is a system of pure 
speculative reason. (McQuillan, 2012, p. 76). 
v There are interesting discussions on the Kantianism of Foucault. Scholars 
argue on the implication of Kantianism in the whole philosophy of 
Foucault on power and subject (Hendricks, 2008).  
vi Levinas speaks of The Third which refers to many others in society. 
Although he speaks frequently of the Other, Levinas does not discount 
the place of many others living in society. Nonetheless, the face –to-face 
encounter with the Other is the exemplary model of any social 
relationship. (Thomas, 2004, p. 109-113. 
 
